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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION, : 
Defendant / Petitioner, : 
v. : Case No. 20081054-SC 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, : 
Plaintiff/ Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF / RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The court of appeals issued its decision in this action on November 28, 2008. 
Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.. 2008 UT App 426, 198 P.3d 1003 
(Addendum A). A timely petition for a writ of certiorari was filed by the defendant. This 
Court granted that petition, limited to two questions stated by the Court. This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear this action pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a) (West 
Supp. 2008). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in its construction and application of 
relevant precedent to Petitioner's claim for severance damages for loss of view. 
2. Whether damages for loss of view may be segregated from overall severance 
damages. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the court of appeals. State v. 
Brake, 2004 UT 95, |11, 103 P.3d 699. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
Constitution of Utah, Art. 1, § 22 [Private property for public use] 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just 
compensation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511 (West Supp. 2008). Compensation and damages — 
How assessed. 
The court, jury, or referee shall hear any legal evidence offered by any of the parties to 
the proceedings, and determine and assess: 
(1) (a) the value of the property sought to be condemned and all improvements 
pertaining to the realty; 
(b) the value of each and every separate estate or interest in the property; and 
(c) if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of each estate or 
interest in each shall be separately assessed; 
(2) if the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, 
the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned by reason of its 
severance from the portion sought to be condemned and the construction of the 
improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff; 
(3) if the property, though no part of it is taken, will be damaged by the construction of 
the proposed improvement, and the amount of the damages; 
(4) separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or 
interest in it, will be benefitted, if at all, by the construction of the improvement proposed 
by the plaintiff. If the benefit is equal to the damages assessed under Subsection (2), the 
owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion 
taken; but if the benefit is less than the damages assessed, the former shall be deducted 
from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the 
value of the portion taken; 
(5) if the properly sought to be condemned consists of water rights or part of a water 
delivery system or both, and the taking will cause present or future damage to or 
impairment of the water delivery system not being taken, including impairment of the 
system's carrying capacity, an amount to compensate for the damage or impairment; 
2 
(6) if land on which crops are growing at the time of service of summons is sought to 
be condemned, the value that those crops would have had after being harvested, taking 
into account the expenses that would have been incurred cultivating and harvesting the 
crops; and 
(7) as far as practicable compensation shall be assessed for each source of damages 
separately. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
UDOT brought condemnation proceedings against two adjacent pieces of property 
in the summer of 1997. UDOT did not seek ownership of the entire parcels of land, but 
only portions thereof.1 Admiral Beverage owned one of the properties and purchased the 
other. R. 72-75 in Case No. 970905361. On July 14, 1999, the district court consolidated 
these actions under Case No. 970905361. R. 98-99 in Case No. 970905361; R. 63-64 in 
Case No. 970905368.2 
In January 2005, UDOT filed a motion in limine, asking that the defendant be 
precluded from presenting evidence at trial of severance damages caused by a loss of 
visibility into the noncondemned portions of the property.3 R. 151-63. Admiral Beverage 
filed a motion in limine asking the court to allow several types of severance damage 
evidence, including that caused by loss of visibility and loss of view. R. 168-409. In its 
Memorandum Decision and Order of October 31, 2005, the court granted UDOT's 
1
 UDOT v. Mark Inv. Corp.. Case No. 970905361 (R. 11-20) and UDOT v. 
Admiral Beverage Corp., Case No. 970905368 (R. 1-10). 
2
 All farther references to the record are to Case No. 970905361. 
3
 The loss of visibility damages were allegedly caused by UDOT's construction 
and modification of the freeway that restricted the remaining property's visibility to 
travelers on 1-15. R. 152-53. 
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motion and denied Admiral Beverage's motion. R. 492-502, a copy is attached as 
Addendum A. The court concluded that no claim for loss of visibility from a freeway 
existed. R. 495-98. 
In May 2006, the district court certified this order as being final pursuant to Utah 
R. Civ. P. 54(b). R. 520-26. Admiral Beverage filed its appeal on May 8, 2006. R. 527-
44. On August 11, 2006, the Utah Court of Appeals dismissed that appeal without 
prejudice because the district court's order was not eligible for certification as final under 
Rule 54(b). R. 556-59. 
In August and October of 2007, UDOT filed further motions in limine. R. 656-64, 
727-35. These motions challenged Admiral Beverage's intent to use evidence of 
damages related to its loss of visibility into its property from 1-15. The motions also 
asked the district court to exclude any severance damages claimed to be caused by 
changes to a road or freeway that did not abut the defendant's property. In opposing 
these motions, defendant claimed that it should be permitted to present evidence of 
damages arising from alleged loss of view out of the remaining property and for loss of 
visibility of the remaining property from 1-15. R. 669-84, 757-75 
In its minute entry of December 27, 2007, the district court granted UDOT's 
motions. R. 862-67, a copy is attached as Addendum B. Defendant filed its petition for 
an interlocutory appeal on January 16, 2008. R. 875. This action came within the 
original jurisdiction of this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (West Supp. 
2008). On January 17, 2008, this Court transferred this action to the Utah Court of 
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Appeals pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. R. 877. On 
January 30, 2008, that court granted the defendant's petition as to "[wjhether the trial 
court erred in excluding evidence of severance damages based on loss of view from the 
remaining property." R. 895. 
On November 28, 2008, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's order. 
Dept. of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp.. 2008 UT App 426, 198 P.3d 1003. The 
court held that the appurtenant easement of view only applied to a public road that 
abutted the property in question. IcL at ^3. The court also rejected the defendant's claim 
that it should be compensated for an alleged loss of visibility from 1-15. Id, at [^5 n.2. 
Defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with this Court that was granted. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The facts concerning the location of Admiral Beverage's property and how it 
relates to 1-15 are taken from Judge Roth's Memorandum Decision and Order of October 
31, 2005. R. 492-502. The district court found that the facts were not "disputed in any 
material way." R. 493. Defendant has never claimed that there was a material issue of 
fact. 
Admiral Beverage owns two adjacent lots that are west of 1-15 in Salt Lake 
County. The property abuts the west side of 500 West, a surface street owned by Salt 
Lake City, which acts as a frontage road in that area. 500 West runs between Admiral 
Beverage's property and 1-15. R. 664 (map of Admiral Beverage's property showing its 
5 
relationship with 1-15 and the portions to be condemned - a copy is attached as 
Addendum C). 
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the 
freeway in that area was moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 
500 West frontage road also be moved further to the west and onto the east 
side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are now 
identified as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these 
consolidated cases. 
R. 493. 
The parcels of land taken from Admiral Beverage for the project were used for the 
reconstruction of 500 West, a street owned by Salt Lake City. As part of the 
reconstruction, 500 West was moved farther west and partially onto Admiral Beverage's 
property. The changes were made by UDOT. None of the defendant's property was used 
for the remodeled 1-15. R. 494. While not mentioned by Judge Roth, it is undisputed that 
both before and after the reconstruction of 1-15 access to Admiral Beverage's property 
was gained by use of 500 West. R. 657. 
Admiral Beverage's interlocutory appeal challenged the district court's orders 
granting UDOT's three motions in limine. UDOT's first motion asked that the defendant 
be precluded from presenting evidence at trial of severance damages caused by a loss of 
visibility into the noncondemned portions of the property from 1-15. R. 151-63. UDOT's 
second motion challenged the appraisal prepared by Jerry Webber because it included the 
same loss-of-visibility damages excluded by the district court's prior order. R. 727-35. 
Defendant acknowledges that Mr. Webber said he was unable to separate damages caused 
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from loss of view (out) from damages caused by loss of visibility (in). R. 774; Brief of 
Appellant at 15-16. UDOT's third motion asked that severance damages claimed to be 
caused by changes to a road or freeway that did not abut the defendant's property be 
excluded. R. 656-64. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Admiral Beverage sought to introduce evidence that the value of its property had 
been diminished due to the loss of view and visibility caused by the reconstruction of I-
15. But defendant's property does not abut 1-15. The land is on the west side of 500 
West, which it abuts, while 1-15 is to the east of 500 West. The appurtenant easement of 
view (out) is a property right that attaches only to the abutting roadway (500 West), not to 
other property or roadways. 
This Court has expressly held that Utah does not recognize a damage claim based 
on a property's loss of visibility (in) from a roadway. Utah law has repeatedly rejected 
efforts to create a property right in the flow of traffic on the public roads past a certain 
piece of land. 
Defendant seeks to circumvent the prior rulings of this Court by claiming damages 
for loss of visibility and view as part of a single sum for the market value of the property. 
It does so without challenging the prior Utah judicial decisions that have refused to create 
the property rights for which it seeks compensation. Defendant has not asked this Court 
to overrule its prior decisions and has failed to meet its burden under the principle of stare 
decisis. 
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ARGUMENT 
Whether severance damages are sought under Article I, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution or Utah's statutes, the result is the same. This Court has used the same 
definition for "damages" under the takings clause of the state constitution and the eminent 
domain statutes. Coleman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 626 (Utah 1990); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Croft. 373 P.2d 697, 699 (Utah 1962). In relation to alleged damages suffered 
by property that was not actually condemned, such damages are limited to those available 
at common law or that involve some physical injury to the property. 
Damages to land, by the construction of a public or industrial 
improvement, though no part thereof is taken as provided for under 78-
34-10(3), . . . is limited to injuries that would be actionable at common law, 
or where there has been some physical disturbance of a right, either public 
or private, which the owner enjoys in connection with his property and 
which gives it additional value, and which causes him to sustain a special 
damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public 
generally. 
Croft, 373 P.2d at 699 (footnote omitted) (rejecting claim for damages to remaining 
property allegedly caused by construction of school where the school was not built on that 
portion of plaintiffs' land that was condemned). See also Coleman, 795 P.2d at 626-627; 
Harold Selman. Inc. v. Box Elder County. 2009 UT App 99, ^[9, 208 P.3d 535 (the takings 
provision of the Utah Constitution does not apply unless the claimant possesses a 
protectable interest in the property). More recently this Court used common law 
principles in interpreting the eminent domain statutes. 
Our holding today also accords with the well-established common law 
principle that severance damages "may be made for any diminution in the 
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value of [an owner's non-condemned land], as long as those damages were 
directly caused by the taking itself and by the condemnor's use of the land 
taken." 
State v. Harvev Real Estate. 2002 UT 107, ^ 11, 57 P.3d 1088 (alteration and first 
emphasis in original, second emphasis added). 
The defendant had the duty to demonstrate that it owned the claimed protected 
property interest and that the interest had been taken or damaged. 
Under article I, section 22, the takings analysis has two principal steps. 
First, the claimant must demonstrate "some protectible interest in property." 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990). If the 
claimant possesses a protectible property interest, the claimant must then 
show that the interest has been "taken or damaged" by government action. 
Strawberry Elec. Serv. Dist. v. Spanish Fork City. 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996). 
I. THE DEFENDANT'S APPURTENANT EASEMENT OF VIEW 
ONLY APPLIES TO THE ABUTTING PUBLIC ROAD - 500 WEST 
Admiral Beverage's claims for severance damages for loss of view and visibility 
related to the reconstruction of 1-15. Loss of view damages are caused by obstructions 
that block the view out from that portion of the property that was not condemned. Loss of 
visibility damages are caused by obstructions that block the view into the noncondemned 
portion of the property from a roadway or highway. 
It is undisputed that the defendant's property does not abut 1-15. Defendant's 
property is divided and separated from 1-15 by 500 West, a street owned by Salt Lake 
City. This physical condition existed both before and after the 1-15 reconstruction. As 
part of the 1-15 reconstruction project, Salt Lake City's 500 West was moved by UDOT 
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further to the west, partially on land taken from the defendant due to the expansion of the 
freeway onto part of Salt Lake City's land. The defendant can nol claim damages for loss 
of view caused by changes made to a public road that his property did not abut. 
Utah has long recognized that an owner of land that abuts a public road enjoys 
rights of easement of access, air, light, and view to the public road. In Dooly Block v. 
Salt Lake Rapid Transit. 33 P. 229, 231 (Utah 1893), this Court explained that abutting 
property owners had the right of access to the street "subject only to the ordinary use of 
the same for the purposes of public travel, and that they are entitled to the use of said 
street, free from unreasonable obstructions, as a means of access, light, and air to their 
premises." 
The appurtenant rights of air, light, and view discussed in Dooly Block and Utah 
State Road Commission v. Miva. 526 P.2d 926 (Utah 1974) are companion to, and 
derivative of, the easement for physical access. "The rights of access, light, and air are 
easements appurtenant to the land of an abutting owner on a street; they constitute 
property rights forming part of the owner's estate." Miya. 526 P.2d at 928.4 As such, 
they create no right greater than the right to physical access. They consist of the right to 
use the public street for access, light, air, and view. They impose no greater burden on 
the public right of way than the servitude necessary to provide the right of access. 
4
 "An owner of land abutting on a street is also in possession of an easement of 
view, which constitutes a property right which may not be taken without just 
compensation." Id at 929. 
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These rights are properly described as rights, or easements, appurtenant to property 
that abuts a public street. Abut is defined as "[t]o reach; to touch. . . . No intervening 
land." Black's Law Dictionary 11 (5th ed. 1979). To claim an appurtenant easement, a 
landowner must meet two requirements. First, the land in question must abut the roadway 
in question. Second, the roadway must be a public road. Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. 
Ludlow. 762 A.2d 1219, 1225 (Vt. 2000). 
Abutting owners have certain private rights which are not common 
to the public generally, such as the rights of view, of light and air, and of 
lateral support, but these rights are subordinate to the right of passage of 
the public, and are subject to reasonable regulation and restriction. 
An abutting owner has two distinct kinds of rights in a highway: a 
public right which he or she enjoys in common with all other citizens, and 
certain private rights which arise from his or her ownership of property 
contiguous to the highway, and which are not common to the public 
generally, and this is the case regardless of whether or not the fee of the 
highway is in him or her. These rights are property of which he or she may 
not be deprived without his or her consent, except on full compensation and 
by due process of law. 
39A C.J.S. Highways § 140 (Westlaw through June 2009) (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted). 
These appurtenant easements apply only to the abutting roadway and not to any 
other road or property. "This state has long recognized that a landowner owning property 
abutting a public street possesses as appurtenant to his lot implied easements for light, air 
and view over the public street. These easements extend to the full width of the street and 
are independent of any fee interest in the street held by the landowner." Haeussler v. 
Braun, 314 N.W.2d 4, 7 (Minn. 1981). The right of view does not pass beyond the public 
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roadway and cross out the other side. Neither does it travel laterally up and down the 
highway. The right does not extend across the abutting roadway to burden private and 
public property on the other side of the public street to guarantee a view over such 
property. Utah's courts have regularly described the right as one of reasonable access to 
and from the property to use the public road. 
The interest protected simply entails the "right of ingress and egress to and 
from . . . property and the abutting public highway." Harvey's property may 
be accessed through both the new frontage road and Old Mountain Road; 
consequently, its right of access has not been denied. The right does not 
extend so far as to guarantee a property owner that his property will be 
accessed through specific intersections or that the roads accessing his 
property will be easily accessed from other thoroughfares. 
State v. Harvev Real Estate. 2002 UT 107, f 14, 57 P.3d 1088 (citation omitted). 
This approach to the rights appurtenant is also incorporated into Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-1-102(11) (West 2004), which defines a limited-access facility as 
a highway especially designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to 
which neither owners nor occupants of abutting lands nor other persons 
have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of 
access, light, air, or view. 
The courts of other states have also followed the general rule that a landowner 
does not have appurtenant easements over the property of their neighbors. These 
easements only apply to the public road that abuts their property. 
As a general matter, a landowner cannot recover from a neighboring 
landowner simply because he dislikes the use to which the second 
landowner put his property. Thus, a landowner could not recover from his 
neighbor just because the other had erected a building on his own property 
which blocked the view from the first owner's land, or the visibility of the 
first owner's land. The only way to prevent a neighbor from constructing a 
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building which would block one's view is to buy an easement of view. The 
logical implication of this position is that a property owner has no right to 
an unobstructed line of vision to his property from anywhere off of his 
property, absent an easement of some sort. 
8.960 Square Feet v. State, 806 P.2d 843, 845-46 (Alaska 1991) (citation and footnotes 
omitted). Seeal_so Collinson v. John L. Scott, Inc., 778 P.2d 534, 537 (Wash. App. 1989) 
("The general rule appears to be that a building or structure cannot be complained of as a 
nuisance merely because it obstructs the view of neighboring property."). 
It is undisputed that Admiral Beverage's property does not abut 1-15. It has at all 
times abutted 500 West, not the freeway. The freeway was built, and remains today, on 
property found on the far side of 500 West from the defendant's land. Defendant's 
appurtenant easements pertain to 500 West and not to 1-15. Judge Faust's decision 
correctly took this fact into consideration. "Defendant is able to assert claims for any 
severance damages relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner 
to 500 West." R. 863. The district court correctly applied Utah law and was properly 
affirmed by the court of appeals. 
The defendant does not directly address this issue in its brief. Instead, Admiral 
Beverage relies solely on Ivers v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 2007 UT 19, 154 P.3d 802. 
Defendant correctly notes that this Court held that damages caused by a loss of the 
appurtenant easement of view can be claimed, in appropriate circumstances, whether or 
not the obstruction was actually built on the condemned portion of the property. Ivers, 
2007 UT 19 at f26. But defendant fails to acknowledge that the easement for view in 
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Ivers clearly pertained to the state road whose reconstruction was alleged to have caused 
the loss of view. The land in Ivers abutted the road in question, h i at 1fl[3-4 (property 
that abutted Highway 89 was condemned to build a new frontage road while the right of 
view was allegedly damaged by elevation of Highway 89). Further, in Ivers the court 
followed Miya in describing the rights in question as being "easements appurtenant to the 
land of an abutting owner on a street." Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at ^|13. 
Defendant errs in reading Ivers too broadly. This Court did not separate the 
appurtenant easement of view, a property right, from the property it is appurtenant to. 
The easement of view applies only to public roads that abut the land in question. It does 
not attach to other roads that may be close by. It did not attach to 1-15 but only to 500 
West, the street abutting Admiral Beverage's property. 
II. UTAH DOES NOT RECOGNIZE DAMAGE CLAIMS FOR LOSS 
OF VISIBILITY 
Even if Admiral Beverage were permitted to claim loss of view damages related to 
a roadway that did not abut its property (1-15), the district court's granting of UDOT's 
motions in limine was still correct. All of the excluded evidence included claims for 
damages based on a loss of visibility. R. 151-63, 495-98, 656-64, 727-35, 773. 
Defendant not only acknowledges this, but argues in its brief that it is impossible to 
segregate damages caused by a loss of view from those allegedly caused by a loss of 
visibility. Brief of Appellant at 15-16. 
But Utah does not recognize a claim for loss of visibility. 
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Neither the legislature nor this court has recognized a protected 
property right in visibility of one's property from the roadway. As a result, 
the court of appeals concluded that Arby's was not entitled to present 
evidence of claimed damage to their property caused by a loss of visibility 
of the property. We agree. In Utah, landowners do not have a protected 
interest in the visibility of their property from an abutting road, even if part 
of their land has been taken in the process. 
In Utah State Road Commission v. Miya, we concluded that the 
"rights of access, light, and air are easements appurtenant to the land of an 
abutting owner on a street. We also concluded in Miya that "[a] property 
owner has no property right to a free and unrestricted flow of traffic past his 
premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle 
the owner to compensation." Similarly, a property owner has no 
recognized property right to free and unrestricted visibility of his property 
by passing traffic, and an impairment of that visibility does not mandate 
compensation. 
The speculative nature of the damages sought in a claim for loss of 
visibility further supports this conclusion. As the court of appeals correctly 
noted, a claim for loss of visibility is essentially a claim for compensation 
for lost business profits. Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
simply does not create a protectable property interest in the mere hope of 
future sales from passing traffic. 
Because property owners have no protectable property interest in 
visibility, the trial court was correct in granting the motion in limine on this 
issue, and the court of appeals was correct in affirming. 
Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at ffl[12-15 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
Admiral Beverage fails to cite any precedent that would have permitted the lower 
courts to allow defendant to seek damages for a claim that is not recognized by Utah law. 
The court of appeals would have erred if it permitted evidence of alleged impairment of 
visibility to be submitted contrary to this Court's decision in Ivers. Far from 
distinguishing between what damage was attributable to loss of view as opposed to loss of 
visibility, the excluded evidence expressly conflated the two. Brief of Appellant at 15-16. 
In an effort to circumvent Ivers, Admiral Beverage relies on State Road Comm'n 
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v. Rohan, 487 P.2d 857 (Utah 1971) for the proposition that damages attributed to the 
purported loss of visibility can be awarded, as long as they are mixed with other alleged 
damages and not stated as a separate amount. This is a mischaracterization of Rohan. 
Rohan involved a claim for severance damages to the remaining property after one-fifth 
of the land had been condemned for the construction of a freeway. The court upheld a 
general award of damages based on an appraisal that included consideration of a 
reduction in the property's value due to the increase in noise that would be caused by the 
adjacent freeway being built. The plurality opinion in Rohan permitted the consideration 
of noise damage even though it could not be raised as a separate claim of damage. Id. at 
859. 
Defendant claims that, like the noise addressed in Rohan, alleged damages for loss 
of visibility can be presented as long as they are mixed with other damage claims and not 
separately presented. But the two are not similar. Rohan cited to the prior law of Utah as 
to when an increase of noise can be considered a compensable damage claim. Id. at 858 
n.4. One of the cases cited in this footnote is Twenty-Second Corp. of Church of Jesus 
Christ of Tatter-Dav Saints v. Oregon Shortline. 36 Utah 238, 103 P. 243 (1909). Oregon 
Shortline made it clear that increased amounts of noise suffered by a landowner could, in 
certain circumstances, state a damage claim. 
It is true that, in addition to the foregoing cases, there are some in 
which the courts have held that noises and other interferences arising from 
the operation of railroad trains are proper elements of damage when they 
affect the use and enjoyment of property. Among this class of cases are 
those which relate to the condemnation of property for public purposes, 
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including railroads, where all the property is not taken, but the property not 
taken is, nevertheless, affected, or where some easement appurtenant to the 
property not taken is interfered with so as to affect the salable or usable 
value thereof. In that class of cases noises and similar interferences which 
may affect the market value of the property not taken are ordinarily 
permitted to be shown, not as independent elements of damage, but as 
elements to be considered in connection with all other things which may 
depreciate the market value of the property interfered with but not taken. 
103 P. at 249. 
Utah law recognized noise as a damage to property, but limited recovery for it due 
to valid public policy considerations. 
If mere annoyances from noises give a right of action for damages, then 
every one who is annoyed must be permitted to sue for and recover 
damages to the extent to which he is affected. The question therefore, in 
each case, would depend upon the intensity of the noises and the extent of 
the annoyance. 
14 
Loss of visibility is not similar to a claim that a landowner's enjoyment of his 
property has been damaged by noise. While Utah law has recognized a limited right to 
recover for damage due to noise, it has never recognized an appurtenant easement of 
visibility. In Ivers the court held that "a property owner has no recognized property right 
to free and unrestricted visibility of his property by passing traffic." Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at 
1J13. Defendant sought recovery for a diminution of the visibility of its property by the 
traveling public, even though this Court has expressly held that no such right existed. 
This is contrary to the decision of this Court in one of the cases cited by the defendant. 
"To recover under article I, section 22, a claimant must possess a protectable interest in 
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property that is taken or damaged for a public use." Bagford v. Ephraim City. 904 P.2d 
1094, 1097 (Utah 1995). This has long been the law of Utah. "The Constitution clearly 
does not require compensation for damages not recognized as actionable at common law." 
State v. Dist. Ct.. 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502, 510 (1937). 
Defendant argues that it can seek compensation for its loss of visibility, even 
though no such property right exists, by combining this item of damages as part of the fair 
market value. But Utah law requires that "as far as practicable compensation shall be 
assessed for each source of damage separately." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-511(7) (West 
Supp. 2008). 
Loss of visibility is not similar to a claim that a landowner's enjoyment of his 
property has been damaged by a loss of a scenic view. In effect, the defendant landowner 
claims a vested right to view and be viewed by passing traffic. Whether it is couched in 
terms of a right to view or a right of visibility, a landowner cannot claim a vested right in 
passing traffic. Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at 1fl[13-15. Establishment and regulation of traffic 
movement is a function of state police powers, and the fact that 1-15 may bring traffic 
near the property does not create a vested right. The government may direct the traffic 
elsewhere without a claim for loss of property rights. "[W]hat the police power may give 
an abutting property in the way of traffic on the highway it may take away . . . ." 
Hampton v. Rd. Comm'n. 21 Utah 2d 342, 445 P.2d 708, 711 (1968). 
In affirming the exclusion of evidence of damages caused by an alleged loss of 
visibility, the court of appeals was following this Court's prior decisions. 
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Insofar as Admiral still seeks to admit evidence addressing the 
reduced visibility of its property to motorists traveling the nearby highways, 
its argument is definitively foreclosed by I vers. See 2007 UT 19, ^ 12-15, 
154P.3d802. 
Dep't of Transp. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., 2008 UT App 426, ^5 n.2, 198 P.3d 1003. 
The court of appeals correctly affirmed the exclusion of such evidence as being 
impermissible and that decision should be affirmed. 
III. DEFENDANT'S MARKET VALUE ARGUMENT IGNORES 
UTAH PRECEDENT THAT REJECTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE 
PROPERTY RIGHTS DEFENDANT CLAIMS 
In its brief, Admiral Beverage has not directly challenged the court of appeals' 
decision. It has not argued that its property abuts or is contiguous to 1-15. It has not 
disputed that this Court has held that Utah law does not recognize a right of visibility 
from a roadway. Instead the defendant argues that to deny it severance damages based on 
view and visibility would prevent it from obtaining the fair market value of its damages. 
Brief of Appellant at 8-9, 15-18. Indeed, the defendant acknowledges that what it seeks is 
contrary to current Utah law. 
Utah cases which have permitted the taking of privately held rights 
without payment of compensation make no effort to reconcile the 
undeniable inconsistency and conflict of such takings with the above quoted 
constitutional, statutory or case law. No justification is given for the unfair 
and forced transfer to UDOT of substantial property rights without payment 
of any compensation, let alone just compensation. 
Brief of Appellant at 9. 
But the defendant has not sought to shoulder its burden when it asks this Court to 
overturn its prior decisions. It has not fully acknowledged that the reason for prior Utah 
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cases that have held contrary to Admiral Beverage's desires is because Utah has not 
recognized the particular private property rights that it claims. The defendant had the 
burden to convince this Court to overrule these prior decisions. It has failed to fulfill that 
duty. 
Those asking us to overturn prior precedent have a substanlial burden of 
persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis. . . . 
The general American doctrine as applied to courts of last resort is that a 
court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents but will follow the rule 
of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced 
that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing 
from precedent. 
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 (Utah 1994); Hover v. State. 2009 UT 38, %L6 
("For us to abandon the Taylor standard, the Hoyers have to meet the 'substantial burden 
of persuasion' required for us to overturn our prior precedent and disregard 'the doctrine 
of stare decisis.5"); State v. Bennett. 2000 UT 34 f 8, 999 P.2d 1 ("But both ignore the 
fact that we do not lightly overrule our prior opinions."). 
Indeed, this Court rejected the market value argument made by Admiral Beverage 
in Ivers. Defendant quotes a partial sentence from Ivers in its brief. "[T]he pursuant loss 
of view and visibility, diminished the market value of the remaining land." Brief of 
Appellant at 11 (arguing that the facts of this case are the same as those found in Ivers). 
Reading the entirety of the sentence emphasizes that the defendants in Ivers did raise the 
same market value claim as does Admiral Beverage. "Arby's sought severance damages, 
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claiming that the condemnation, and the pursuant loss of view and visibility, diminished 
the market value of their remaining land." Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at §5. 
This Court has repeatedly rejected the existence of a right of visibility by the 
traveling public. In Ivers, this Court cited to its prior decision in Miya that rejected such 
a right. Ivers, 2007 UT 19 at Tj 13. Besides Hampton, cited above in Point II, Justice 
Wolfe of this Court reached the same conclusion in State v. Rozelle, 101 Utah 464, 120 
P.2d 276, 278 (1941) (Wolfe concurring). 
Any losses resulting from unreasonably cutting off their own access to their 
property or unreasonably interfering with their light and air given by reason 
of their abutting on a public highway are compensable. But not the loss of 
flow of traffic from the street into their place of business. The law does not 
give them a vested right in the business which travel along a public 
highway may have afforded them. 
This Court also followed Miya and Hampton in State v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 
UT 107,1J14, 57 P.3d 1088 (finding that there was no right to a particular flow of traffic). 
Utah law has long held that the right of view is an appurtenant easement possessed 
by land that abuts a public roadway. As cited above, the right to view was held by this 
Court to apply to property abutting the public road in question in Ivers, Miya, Harvey, 
and Dooly Block. See Point I, above. The same result was reached in Bailey Serv. & 
Supply Corp. v. State, 533 P.2d 882, 883 (Utah 1975) ("It is generally held that an 
abutting property owner has an easement of access, light and air."). "We have held that 
an abutting property owner may recover for losses sustained such as result from the 
shutting off or interfering with his access, light, or air." Rozelle, 120 P.2d at 278. 
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The challenged court of appeals' decision simply followed the prior decisions of 
this Court. The defendant has failed to explain why this Court's prior decisions were 
originally erroneous or are no longer sound. The defendant having failed to shoulder its 
"substantial burden," the court of appeals should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, the respondent urges this Court to affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this 29th day of June, 2009. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ Respondent 
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ADDENDUM "A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH D E P A R T M E N T OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION (Assignee of Mark 
Investment Trust); PARK CITY WEST 
& ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & 
TRUST COMPANY nka BANK ONE, 
UTAH; and VALLEY MORTGAGE 
COMPANY nka UTAH INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
A D M I R A L B E V E R A G E 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") filed a Motion in Limine to which 
efendant Admiral Beverage Coiporation ("Admiral") responded with a cross-motion, Motion in 
imine of Defendant Admiral Beverage Corporation to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect 
air Market Value ("Admiral's Motion in Limine"). While both motions are nominally focused on 
MEMORANDUM DECISION and 
ORDER (Cross-Motions in Limine) 
CONSOLIDATED: 
Case No. 970905361 CD 
Case No. 970905368CD 
Judge Stephen L. Roth 
the parties" competing views of the admissibility of basically the same evidence, they recognize that 
the real issue is the scope of severance damages that may be awarded to defendants under Utah 
condemnation law. The parties submitted memoranda supporting their own motions and opposing 
their opponents, as well as reply memoranda. The court heard argument on the motions on June 28, 
2005, where UDOT was represented by Randy S. Hunter, Assistant Attorney General, and Admiral 
was represented by Rex E. Madsen (who argued) and Reed L. Martineau, Snow Christensen & 
Martineau. The court gave leave to Admiral to submit a new survey in response to one submitted 
by UDOT just before the hearing. That survey was provided to the court on August 31, 2005, and 
the matter was submitted for decision. Having considered the memoranda, affidavits and other 
evidence submitted, along with the arguments of counsel, the court GRANTS UDOT's Motion in 
Limine and DENIES Admiral's Motion in Limine, for the reasons set forth below. 
DECISION 
A. Factual Background. 
The relevant facts do not appear to be disputed in any material way. Admiral owns two 
adjacent lots directly to the west of the 1-15 freeway, bordering 500 West, which serves as a frontage 
road in that area, running north and south between the Admiral lots and the west side of the freeway. 
In connection with the 1-15 reconstruction project, the west side of the freeway in that area was 
moved closer to the Admiral lots, requiring that the 500 West frontage road also be moved further 
to the west and onto the east side of Admiral's property, resulting in the condemnation of what are 
now identified by UDOT as parcels 109 and 110, which are the subject of these consolidated cases. 
- ? . 
Before reconstruction, the existing freeway lanes had an elevation about two feet higher than 
the surface of Admiral's property. The reconstructed freeway is elevated considerably higher, with 
a portion of the freeway wall reaching a height of about 28 feet at a point about six inches outside 
and to the west of the southeast corner of parcel 109, the former southeast corner of the Admiral 
property, and about 62 feet from the nearest point of Admiral's property remaining after the 
condemnation.1 While 500 West was reconstructed on the taken parcels, no part of the rebuilt 
freeway itself is located on that property. 
Based on an appraisal, UDOT deposited into court a total of $163,100 as payment of just 
condemnation for the taking of parcels 109 and 110. Admiral appears to have only minimal 
disagreement that the deposited amount is a fair value for the property taken, as valued on a square-
footage basis. The central issue is whether there are additional compensable severance damages to 
the remainder of Admiral's property. Based on the reports of its own expert appraisal witnesses, 
Admiral claims that the market value of the remaining property has been reduced by "(a) loss of air, 
light, view? visibility and aesthetics, and (b) increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the 
reconstructed 1-15 freeway . . . ." Admiral's Memorandum in Support of its Motion in Limine to 
Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value and in Opposition to Plaintiffs 
1
 Admiral originally argued that a portion of the freeway wall at issue was actually built 
within the southeast corner of parcel 109, based on UDOT engineering drawings that appeared to 
support such a conclusion. About two weeks before the hearing, however, UDOT submitted, 
through the Affidavit of Keith Hafen, a more detailed survey that showed the wall, at its nearest 
point, to be six inches outside of the condemned parcel 109. Subsequent to the hearing, Admiral had 
its own survey done, which confirmed that the wall was outside of parcel 109, although four to five 
inches at its closest point rather than six, a difference that is not material to the issues before the 
court. 
Motion in Limine ("Admiral's Memorandum in Support") at 2. UDOT contends that these rights 
are not compensable as severance damages under applicable law. 
B. Analysis. 
The factors identified by Admiral's appraisers as damaging the remaining property seem to 
fall into three categories: the loss of visibility and prominence of the remainder due to the size and 
location of the new freeway structures; loss of air and light to, and view from, the remaining 
property; and the increase in noise, dust, fumes and so on from increased traffic flow nearer to the 
remainder than the prior freeway. The claim for loss of visibility is the only subject addressed in 
UDOT's Motion in Limine, but all of these factors are addressed in Admiral's Motion in Limine, 
which is imposed in toto by UDOT. The loss of visibility issue is addressed separately as a matter 
of first impression in Utah. 
1. Loss of Visibility. 
There seems to be no dispute that reconstruction of the portion of I-15 passing by the Admiral 
property, which moved the freeway closer and significantly raised its grade, restricts the visibility 
of the remainder parcels from passing vehicles in comparison with the prior freeway configuration. 
The issue of whether reduced visibility is a compensable severance damage has not been directly 
addressed by Utah appellate courts. Nevertheless, the court believes that analogous Utah case law 
provides guidance in this area. 
A long line of Utah cases has established the principle that the appurtenant rights of an owner 
of abutting property do not include an interest in the traffic flow from a public road or highway 
passing by his property that justifies severance damages if reduced or taken away. In Hampton v. 
State Road Commission, 445 P.2d 708 (Utah 1968), the court noted that fctthe right of ingress or 
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egress to or from one's property [does not] include any right in and to existing public traffic on the 
highway, or any right to have such traffic pass by one's abutting property." Id. at 711. The court 
explained: 
The reason is that all traffic on public highways is controlled by the police power of 
the State, and what the police power may give an abutting property owner in the way 
of traffic on the highway it may take away, and by any such diversion of traffic the 
State and any of its agencies are not liable for any decrease of property values by 
reason of such diversion of traffic, because such damages are "damnum absque 
injuria'' or damage without legal injury. 
Id. at 347. See also, Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Hislop, 362 P.2d 580, 581 (Utah 
1961) ('The owner of land abutting on a street or highway has no property or other vested right in 
the flow of traffic on that street or highway and is not entitled to compensation when that flow of 
traffic is diminished as a result of eminent domain proceedings"); Utah State Road Commission v. 
Miya, 526 P.2d 926,928 (Utah 1974) ("A property owner has no right to a free and unrestricted flow 
of traffic past his premises, and any impairment or interference with this flow does not entitle the 
owner to compensation."); Utah Department ofTransportation v. Harvey Real Estate, 2002 UT 107, 
|^14 (citing Miya and quoting Hampton for the principle stated above). 
Here, a significant portion of Admiral's claimed severance is based on the reduction in 
visibility from the reconstructed freeway when compared to its original configuration. The visibility 
that was lost, under these circumstances, was necessarily a function of the passage of traffic. In other 
words, the original visibility of the site resulted from the construction of the freeway by the State, 
which exposed the Admiral property to the view of passing motorists who used the freeway as a 
route of travel. Under existing law, if the State had moved the freeway route horizontally, to a 
different location far enough from the Admiral property that it traffic no longer passed by it, the 
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deprivation of the passing traffic itself would not be a compensable injur/. It is difficult to see how 
moving the freeway vertically, so that traffic continues to pass by the property but without being able 
to see it, results in an injury that is any different as a practical matter or that is legally distinctive in 
any meaningful way. The court therefore does not believe that diminishment of visibility from a 
road or highway is any more compensable as severance damages than a more general diversion oi 
traffic flow would be. 
Moreover, even if a right to visibility were found to be appurtenant to landowners abutting 
a highway or road, the rights of abutting owners with respect to a freeway are significantly more 
limited. 1-15 is a tc[l]imited-access facility," which is defined by statute as "a highway especially 
designated for through traffic, and over, from, or to which neither owners nor occupants of abutting 
lands nor any other persons have any right or easement, or have only a limited right or easement of 
access, light, air, or view." U.C.A. § 72-1-102 (11). This definition suggests, among other things, 
an intent to restrict the appurtenant rights of lands abutting freeways so as to limit the scope of 
severance damages attributable to such rights. 
Admiral relies in part on People v. Ricardi, 144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944), and subsequent 
decisions following it, for the proposition that a landowner is entitled to severance damages for the 
loss of the view of his property from a highway. The California Court of Appeals, however, 
subsequently held that Ricardi's "right to a view" does not apply to freeways. The court upheld the 
lower court's conclusion that an owner uhas no legal right to a view of his property from the 
freeway:' 
A freeway is unlike a highway. An abutter/landowner has a right to a view from a 
public road or highway. However, while the purpose of a highway is to provide 
landowners with abutter's rights, the purpose of a freeway is to eliminate those rights. 
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People ex rel Department of Transportation v. Wilson, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 55 (Cal.App. 1994) 
(citation to Ricardi omitted). The court noted that the purpose of roads or highways is to allow 
access from abutting private property and to allow travelers along the road or highway "to view a 
business, drive into it, patronize it, and reenter the highway" but that "[s]uch purposes are 
antagonistic to the purpose of a freeway," which is designed to "'prevent just that sort of thing.*'* 
Id. (citations omitted). The court went on to discuss a California statute similar in import to Utah's: 
For that reason, Streets and Highway Code section 23.5 provides that owners of 
abutting lands to a freeway have limited or no right of access to or from their abutting 
lands. Obviously a freeway restricts rights of access and related rights such as the 
right to a view. 
Id 
Therefore, even if the court were inclined to find a right to a view of one's abutting property 
from a road or highway under Utah law, the court concludes that a landowner "has no legal right to 
a view of his property from the freeway." 
2. Other Damages. 
Admiral also claims it is entitled to severance damages for "loss of air, light, view, visibility 
and aesthetics," a bundle of rights that may include, but goes beyond, the right to a view from the 
freeway, as well as for "increased fumes and dust from traffic traveling on the reconstructed 1-15 
freeway." The court concludes that Utah law does not allow recovery for such damages under the 
circumstances of these consolidated cases. 
The claimed damages appear to arise either from the elevation of the grade of the freeway 
or from increased traffic due to the freeway improvements. Neither the construction of the elevated 
ramp or the reconstruction of the freeway itself, however, occurred on Admiral's property; the only 
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improvement constructed on Admiral's property was the relocation of the 500 West frontage road. 
Utah cases have been consistent in holding that severance damages are limited to those caused by 
the taking itself or attributable to improvements constructed on the taken property. The court in 
Miya. in finding compensable the loss of view from a remainder property caused by construction of 
a highway highway structure, noted that "the loss of view occasioned by a proposed public structure 
to be erected, in pari at least, upon a parcel of property taken by condemnation from a unit" was a 
factor to be taken into account in determining severance damages. Miya, 526 P.2d at 929 (emphasis 
added). 
This precept was emphasized in Utah Dep 7 of Transportation v. D Ambrosio, 743 P.2d 1220 
(Utah 1987), where the state took a private road to two residences, which it paved and made public 
in connection with a highway extension. The Court rejected the landowners' claim that they were 
entitled to severance damages from construction of the highway: 
The general rule is that damages attributable to the taking of others' property and the 
construction of improvements thereon are not compensable. Such damages suffered 
generally by all the property owners in the area are deemed consequential. 
Severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion of the parcel of 
property where the taking or the construction of the improvement on that part causes 
injury to that portion of the parcel not taken. 
Id at 1221-22 (emphasis in the original). 
The court reemphasized its D 'Ambrosio holding in Harvey Real Estate, supra, an appeal of 
a trial court's grant of the state's motion in limine excluding certain severance damage evidence. 
In Harvey, the landowner sought severance damages for the diminution in value of its remainder 
property resulting from the closure of an intersection as part of a road project for which a portion of 
its land was taken. Similar to an argument Admiral makes here, the OAvner contended that the 
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intersec,ionclosure"wasmadepossibleo„lyby.he,aki„gofHarveysproperty...»Ha^,2002 
UT 107, 112. Harvey asserted that limiting severance damages to only those resulting from 
improvements constructed a, leas, in par, on the porta of the property taken conflict* with the 
broad language of U.C.A. § 78-34-10(2), which provides for assessment of damages ,o a remainder 
from the taking of a portion of the property and from "the construction of the improvement in the 
proposed by the plaintiff [condemning authority]." Tire court disagreed: 
Section 78-34-10 gives a landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused 
bv,he construction of the improvement made on the severed property, t does not 
given the landowner the right to present evidence of damages caused by other facets 
of the construction project. 
* * * 
We held essentially the same in Utah Department of Transportation v. DAmbr<mo 
741P 2d 1220,1222 (Utah 1987), although we did not reference section 78o4-l 0(2). 
There we stated that "severance damages are those caused by the taking of a portion 
If the parcel of property where the taking or the construction of Improvement on 
tat pat causes injury to that portion of the property not taken." (Emphasis added. 
Ou ho Ming today also accords with the well-established common law principle that 
feveranc damages "may be made for any diminution in the value of [an owner s 
Ton condemned land], as long as those damages were directly caused by the taking 
LVand^thecondemnor'suseofthela 
§ 368 (1996) (emphasis added) 
Id a, 1110-11 (interpolations and emphasis in the original, some citations omitted). 
The court therefore concludes that damages resulting from construction of the elevated ramp 
j * outside the taken parcels, as well as damages from the reconfiguration of the freeway as par, of 
lhe reconstruction project are no, compensable as severance damages under U,ah law. This appears 
,„ include evidence related ,o all of the components of severance damages" that were taken in.o 
accoun," by Admiral's expert appraisers and enumera.ed a, paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of Robert 
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A. Steele and paragraph 7 of the Affidavit of John C. Brown (Exhibits A and B, respectively, to 
Admiral's Memorandum in Support), except for "loss of parking."2 
ORDER 
It is therefore ORDERED that UDOT's Motion in Limine is GRANTED, and Admiral's 
Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of All Factors That Affect Fair Market Value is DENIED. 
DATED this _5[_ day of October, 2005. 
Stephen L. Roth '-jv 
DISTRICT JUDGE U 
2
 The facts of this case illustrate the sometimes arbitrary nature of the rule that the court has 
relied on in making its decision here. Without so finding, it is certainly possible that the court's 
decision would have been significantly different if the offending elevated freeway ramp had been 
built six inches within, rather than six inches outside, the condemned parcel 109. In this regard 
Admiral has advanced an argument that has special appeal given the harsh result the difference of 
a matter of inches may produce. That argument proposes that if a taking is part of an integrated 
project (which Admiral argues is the case here), the landowner should be entitled to compensation 
for damages resulting from specific improvements related to the purpose of the taking and causing 
specific injury to the remainder, even if they were not constructed within the immediate boundaries 
of the take. See Admiral Beverage Corporation's Reply Memorandum in Support of Its Motion in 
Limine . ... at 6-10. This approach recognizes that the actual reduction in value of the remainder 
from the improvement, as a practical matter, may be no different when it is located just within or just 
outside of the taken parcel. 
The court believes, however, that the repeated (and apparently unequivocal) holdings of the 
Utah Supreme Court, as addressed above, constrain it from seriously considering such an approach 
at this level, because it would involve a departure from current law. In this regard, the appellate 
courts are better equipped to identify, analyze and resolve the competing public and private interests. 
as well as the legal complications, that would be implicated in such a change in approach to 
severance damages. The resolution of these issues must therefore be left to some future appeal. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ADMIRAL BEVERAGE CORPORATION 
(ASSIGNEE OF MARK INVESTMENT 
COMPANY) ; PARK CITY WEST & 
ASSOCIATES; VALLEY BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, nka BANK ONE, UTAH; 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 970905361 
970905368 
(Consolidated) 
UDOT's Motions in Limine on the issue of view and visibility and 
concerning Jerry R. Weber's testimony on the subject of severance damages 
caused by loss of view and visibility was heard by the Court on December 
18, 2007, at 10:00 a.m. After hearing arguments thereon, review of the 
pleadings and a specific review of the Decision dated October 31 s t, 2005 
issued by Judge Roth in this casef che Court grants UDOT's Motions in 
Limine. The Court also refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and 
adopts the same here. 
Defendant is able to assert claims for any severance damages 
relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner 
to 500 West. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this 24th day of December, 2007. 
ROBERT P. FAUST 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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UDOT's Motion in Limine on the issue of view and visibility 
(concerning Jerry R. Weber's testimony on the subject of severance 
damages cause d by loss of view and visibility) was heard by the Court on 
December 18, 2007, at 10:00 a.m. After hearing arguments thereon, revie 
of the pleadings and a specific review of the Decision dated October 31, 
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2005 issued by Judge Roth in this case, the Court grants UDOT's Motion 
in Limine. The Court refers the parties to Judge Roth's decision and 
adopts the same here. 
Defendant is able to assert claims for any severance damages 
relating to abutment rights pertaining to being an adjoining landowner 
to 500 West. 
This Minute Entry decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
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DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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REVISED PARCELS 109 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 
D R A W N BY Q K H CHECKED BY K R H 
LOCATION 19QQ SOUTH 500 WEST 
ESI E N G I N E E R I N G 
3500 SOUTH MAIN SUIIC 206 
S»L1 LA*£ C I 1 1 Ul 84115 
(801 >263 ITS? <801 1263 1780 fA 
SCALE IN METERS 
1 rOOT = 3048 METER 
I 15 TAKINGS 
10b00 SOUTH TO 500 NORTH 
RIGHT OF WAY PLAN SHEET 
PROJECT N O . SP 15 7(116)304 
DATE 29 MAY 1996 
COUNTY SALT LAKE 
TEMP SHEET 
n 
